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THE NONINVESTMENT VALUE OF CONTROL STOCK,
DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J.t
In the 1968 federal case of Christophides v. Porco' Charles Bluh-
dorn and his expansionist Gulf and Western were accused of passing a
premium to Fasco, the incumbent contr6leur, for the control of the
Brown Company, a diversified paper manufacturer. The court dismissed
this accusation summarily: "[A] purchaser is free to offer a premium
for a block of control stock. This is so, even though control stock is
purchased pursuant to a plan to acquire the remainder of the shares at
a lower price ... ."' As for Fasco the recipient, such a sale-of-control
premium was equally blameless. "Even assuming that Fasco realized a
premium for its controlling stock, that alone would not entitle plaintiffs
to relief."'3 Judge Pollack saw no reason for looking deeper into the
matter, since a "controlling stockholder is under no duty to other stock-
holders to refrain from receiving a premium upon the sale of his stock
which reflects merely the control potential of that stock. There is no
obligation under such circumstances to 'share and share alike.' -'
What legitimate values did the New York Federal District Court-
and arguably Charles Bluhdorn and Gulf and Western-envisage in
"merely the control potential" of the 23 per cent block of Brown stock? Is
it possible to break down this "control potential" into its constitutent-
and salable-elements? Once broken down, moreover, why do these control
elements belong exclusively to the "controlling stockholder ?" Why is there
"no obligation under such circumstances to 'share and share alike' " with
the 77 per cent public shareholders?
These questions surrounding the various values of control stock have
haunted both courts and commentators for decades. The answers will be
attempted in a Prelude, four parts: (I) Total Contr6leur Contribution,
tProfessor of Law, University of Iowa.
1. 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2. Id. at 405. Porco received unqualified support, but without elaboration, from the
Tenth Circuit in McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (1969).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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(II) Total Corporate Compensation, (III) The Ownership of the
Control Assets, (IV) The Sale-of-Control Premium-Bribe, and a
Conclusion.
THE PRELUDE
Over the decades of this confusion court and commentator have
been mizzled by a plethora of 'control values'-some attached to the
control itself, some integral to the concomitant stock, some legitimate,
some illegitimate. This variegated mix of underlying control advantages
has been difficult to sort out, as if one had three or four jigsaw puzzles
in a single box, and did not know it. The first chore, therefore: To
separate the puzzles, and work on them one at a time.
Illegitimate Desires
The readiest exclusion from discussion is outright marauding. In
the long-famous looting cases of the early forties,5 the prize of control
was the liquid portfolio. In Caplan v. Lionel Corp.6 the prospect of
unloading several corporate 'white elephants'-held by his Premier cor-
poration, but destined for Lionel motivated Sonnabend to buy control
from Muscat. In Perlman v. Feldmann' the Wilport Syndicate sought a
captive steel supply at favoring rates. Understandably Charles Bluhdorn
and his GW-and certainly Judge Pollack in Porco-had none of these
values in mind in seeking "the control potential" of the Brown Company.
Nor should such illicit aspects of corporate control be relevant to the
noninvestment value of control-stock. Infinite are the varieties of larceny
-from the bald to the subtle-and none are peculiar to corporate control.
Such a study would be barren. Recall throughout, therefore, that the
present concern must only be the benefits legally following from control.
Any illicit returns not only break the rules of the corporate game but
render futile any reasoned dissection of the noninvestment value of
control stock.
Investment Value
The sorting out of the second alien puzzle in the jigsaw box is far
more difficult. Unwittingly the investment value of the stock itself has
been indiscriminately grouped-and with baneful results-with the con-
5. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22, 24 (E.D. Pa.
1940) ; Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 652 (1941).
6. Matter of Caplan, 151 N.Y.L.J. at 14, col. 3 (1964).
7. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'g 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). For an analysis of this famous case, see Bayne, The Sale-
of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 615 (1969).
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geries of noninvestment values inhering in the control alone. Yet the
one puzzle has absolutely nothing to do with the other, except for the
happenstance of being in the same 'control stock' box. The investment
value of 'control' stock has essentially nothing to do with the control, and
everything to do with the stock. The noninvestment value of control
'stock' has nothing to do with the stock, and everything to do with the
control.
At this point a technically exact definition will facilitate the seg-
regation:
The Investment Value of "Control Stock' is the total worth
of a given block of stock, composed of two elements: (1)
The base value of the block antedating the advent to the cor-
poration of a new contr~leur and (2) The increment to the
block attributable to the superadded talents of the new con-
troleur.
One does not find difficulty with the generic concept of 'investment
value'-the worth inherent in the stock itself, dependent on the dollars-
and-cents return in dividends and capital gain-but the specific limitation
to 'control stock' mystifies, and rightly so, because it is a misnomer.
The accession of a new contr6leur with his estimable contribution to the
firm enhances the value of all stock equally, whether 'control' or other-
wise, whoever the owner, however held. True, a 'control block' may
happen to be the accidental concomitant of a transfer of control, may pass
at the time of the appointment of a new contr6leur to head the firm. Yet
the sale of such stock is intrinsically unconnected with the change of
control. A new contr6leur at AT&T would hardly refer his tenure to
stock holdings, but rather to the domination of the proxy and the share
dispersal.
The crux of the concept of the investment value of 'control stock'
lies in the personal qualifications of the successor contraleur, the dif-
ference between the corporation before and after. Technically, the totality
of these new-contr6leur talents is the contr6leur increment:
The increase in value to all stock of a corporation referable
exclusively to the proven abilities of a new controleur-the
differential between the contributions to corporate value of the
outgoing and incoming contr6leur.
This understood, the investment value, enhanced by the advent of a
new contr6leur, is scarcely limited to any particular block of stock. The
efforts-and predictable successes-of the new contr6leur are directed to
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the entire corporate entity and correspondingly increase the value of
every single share, willy-nilly. Yet in the past this value has been
erroneously attributed to the 'control stock' exclusively.
Further, it cannot be the present purpose to decide who may realize
the dollar value of this contr6leur increment, or under what conditions,
by a direct sale of stock from incumbent to incoming contr6leur, by
purchase or sale on the general market, by a pro rata tender offer to all
corporate shareholders, or in whatever other way. In fact, the conclusion
has been reached elsewhere that any realization of 'investment value'
must be effected only on terms set by an impartial market-the minority
public, for example, or the Big Board-informed fully of all elements of
the new-contr6leur increment, or decrement.'
But the court in Porco-and correspondingly Bluhdorn and his
GW-made no mention of the investment value of 'control stock.'
'Contr6leur increment' was not advanced as their rationale for the
"premium for a block of control stock."
Noninvestinent Value
Arguably the subject of Judge Pollack's discussion, and of this
study, is rather a set of control advantages "which reflects merely the
control potential of that stock," those values which would flow from the
later exercise of control, completely irrespective of any stock.
If one were to assume, arguendo but justifiably, a complete separa-
tion of control from stock (hence the impossibility of investment, and
the necessity of noninvestment, value), what advantages attach to con-
trol? Begin with a tentative, even loose, working definition, with the
objective of continual technical refinement over succeeding pages:
The 'Noninvestment' Value of Control 'Stock' is the totality
of those legitimate values which inhere in the power of con-
trol, "merely the control potential," (irrespective of, and in
contradistinction to, the investment value, including particularly
the contr6leur increment, of the concomitant stock) and flow
from the right and duty to direct the corporation through the
domination of the board of directors.
With the noninvestment-value puzzle alone left in the box, how put the
pieces together in an intelligible pattern?
Judge Hincks on the trial level in Feldmann9 was deeply confused
8. For a fuller treatment of this collateral and highly complicated question, see
Bayne, The Investment Value of Control Stock, 22 STAN. L. REV. - (1970).
9. Id. at 184.
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in his overall philosophy of corporate control-he was reversed by the
Second Circuit-but he nonetheless correctly knew that "the control
potential" was in itself a value much to be desired. He sets the general
scene, moreover, toward an item-for-item enumeration of the many
species and subspecies of the genus "control potential."
When the distribution of a corporate stock is such that as
a practical matter under the corporate charter and by-laws a
given block-whether a majority block or one somewhat less-
can control the election of the directors, the power is one that
may be utilized to control the corporate management. . . . It is
obvious, I think, that some at least of the specific applications
of the power have inherent value.... .0
At another point Hincks expresses the same idea when he refers to
"the incidents of the electoral power ... which contributes value to the
entire bundle of rights and powers.. .. ""
In the famous federal case in 1962, Honigman v. Green Giant
Co.,1" Judge Nordbye showed himself much of a mind with Hincks in
his control philosophy. But he also fully appreciated-perhaps more
realistically than Judge Hincks-the very real cash-money value of cor-
porate control.
No . . . shareholder could be expected to forego the power
of control of a company of this size without receiving in
return a consideration commensurate with the value of the
control which he foregoes13
Underlying this sweeping reference to "the power of control" Judge
Nordbye had before his mind's eye, and in the Green Giant brief, a
methodical-some might even call it a Machiavellian-itemization of
those "specific applications of the power" to which Hincks referred.
The Glore, Forgan Report
When the Cosgrove family finally realized that their Green Giant
could grow no taller without a healthy infusion of the green of public dol-
lars, they consulted Glore, Forgan & Co., the Chicago brokerage house,
(impellingly redolent of Koko's consultation with Pooh Bah, as private
secretary, or perhaps more apropos, as his solicitor, anent his nuptials)
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 208 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1961), affd, 309 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963).
13. Id. at 758.
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toward an estimate of the dollar value of their control over Green Giant.
In the event, Glore, Forgan and Judge Nordbye both concluded to a
premium of roughly 2 million dollars14 ("Although there are broad
limits to the control power . . . . and hence to its value, there is no
question that this value is real and substantial"'") even though the
Cosgroves never actually parted with control, merely relinquished
absolute-majority for equally effective mere-incumbency control. Some
nine years later they remained very much the contr6leur of Green Giant.
But incredibly pertinent to the present purposes, the result of the
Glore, Forgan counsel was a detailed 27 page report to the Green Giant
board, that is, the Cosgrove family, detailing a "Plan of Recapitalization
for the Green Giant Company," with unblushing emphasis on the "Ad-
vantages . . . of Control."6 These several pages were aimed at, and
arguably were successful in, establishing for Judge Nordbye the "con-
sideration commensurate with the value of the control" of Green Giant.
Reducibly, therefore, the question was simple: What control advantages
were worth 2.1 million dollars to the Cosgroves? Even though they
never handed them over.
It was as if the Glore, Forgan Report had set itself especially to
search out and analyze Hincks' "specific applications of the power"'"
of control. The opening paragraph, even its subheading, is certainly
apposite to introduce a systematic breakdown of those "advantages of
control" which constitute "merely the control potential," to wit, the
noninvestment value of control.
Specific Areas of Advantage
In considering the advantages of control . ..we are not
primarily concerned with advantages from the possible illegal
actions [sic]. However, there are many possible actions which
... are either legal or on the borderline. Specific areas of such
action are as follows."
The Control Advantages Specified
The Glore, Forgan Report will serve as a matrix, but no more, for
the development of a comprehensive pattern of those values flowing from
"merely the control potential." Remember, especially when the Report
14. Id. at 760.
15. Defendants' Exhibit K, Plan of Recapitalization for the Green Giant Co.,
Glore, Forgan & Co., Record at 324-350, Honigman v. Green Giant Co., 309 F.2d 667
(8th Cir. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Report].
16. Id. at 338.
17. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952).
18. Report at 338.
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strays too near "the borderline," that all illegitimate objectives have by
postulate been excluded from consideration. Moreover, this capitulation
is neither all-inclusive nor hierarchical as to importance.
"Adverse Contracts" 1": Glore, Forgan was "not primarily concerned
with advantages from the possible illegal actions."2 But if such con-
tracts are truly "adverse," the Report has already stepped well over
"the borderline." In fact, the border line becomes more like a tightrope
as the Report describes these contracts.
Entering into contracts with suppliers or agents owned
by the [controlling] stockholders could be advantageous.
However, opportunities to do this are probably limited and the
advantages small. Contracts not made on an arms-length bar-
gaining basis would certainly be open to attack.2
Assuredly the law would attack any contract that did not insist on a
legitimate quid for the corporate quo. The power, however, to allocate
many kinds of corporate contracts, even on stringently legitimate terms,
can be highly beneficial to an incumbent contr6leur.
As with suppliers so too with consumers. Judge Hincks ranked
such contract allocation high on his list of desiderata.
Turning to another specific application of the power of
corporate control . . . it is obvious, I think, that the power to
control the selection of the customers is a factor adding
materially to the value of the block of stock to which the power
is appurtenant. It is another one of the incidents of the electoral
power of stock which contributes value to the entire bundle
of rights and powers which is wrapped in a control block of
stock.22
If one were to concede-probably unjustifiably-the legitimacy of the
Feldmann plan of interest-free prepayments by end-users of Newport's
steel during the Korean gray market, these "corporate opportunities '22
might be classed as a licit control advantage.
"Liquidation: The not unusual practice of obtaining control in order
to secure a capital gain by liquidating the company"24 could be a
perfectly legal maneuver if two prerequisites were satisfied: (1) Statutory
19. Id. at 339.
20. Id. at 338.
21. Id. at 339.
22. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952).
23. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955).
24. Report at 339.
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compliance with liquidation provisions, and (2) the fairness of any
plan. Liquidation was the objective in Commonwealth Title Ins. &
Trust Co. v. Seltzer,2" in which the Continental Hotel Company pos-
sessed as its sole asset a valuable piece of real estate. (The sale of control
in Seltzer was struck down for reasons other than the projected liquida-
tion itself.)
"Elimination of Dividends: The cutting or elimination of dividends
to avoid personal income taxes . . ."" would seem to be clearly over the
border line. As Glore, Forgan admits: "Furthermore, if the case were
extreme the Company might well develop problems with the Department
of Internal Revenue.
27
Perquisites: The use of the company jet, executive limousine or
yacht, membership in city, country and boat clubs, "plus other perquisites
of the office including such things as stock options, pensions, insurance
coverage, et cetera,"2 all are legitimate and highly desirable habiliments
of the office of control. This is true even though the Report felt that:
"The areas in which control stock can exercise discretion in the matter of
granting of stock options are not regarded as very important in view of
existing law and generally accepted corporate practice." 9
"Mergers and Consolidations: The practice of arranging mergers
and consolidations advantageous to the controlling persons' outside in-
terests might prove difficult to carry out. Minnesota law requires that all
shareholders be notified of such proposed action."2 " Here again the
Report seems properly skittish about its footwork. "Although a certain
amount of alertness would be needed, the [public] stockholders
undoubtedly could block such actions by dissenting and demanding the
fair cash value for their shares."'"
A merger was the very legitimate objective in Manacher v. Rey-
nolds.2 In Lionel, 3 to the contrary, Sonnabend had several illegitimate
mergers in mind. In Porter v. Healy4 the American Gas Company sought
control of the Pottstown Light, Heat & Power Company toward its
eventual absorption.
The Intangibles: At a certain point, purely financial considerations
25. 227 Pa. 410, 76 A. 77 (1910).
26. Report at 339.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 340.
29. Id. at 339.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 39 Del. Ch. 401, 165 A.2d 741 (1960).
33. Matter of Caplan, 151 N.Y.L.J. at 14, col. 3 (1964).
34. 244 Pa. 427, 91 A. 428 (1914).
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invariably give way to more subtle human urgings. Such natural drives
are difficult of monetary evaluation, but nonetheless are powerful pro-
pellants toward corporate control. The triple incalculables of Prestige,
Power, the Inner Satisfaction of Accomplishment are foremost among
control values. A dollar sign can be set opposite them only during ad hoc
negotiations between corporation and incipient contr~leur.
"Management and Salaries" : Glore, Forgan's earthy treatment
of this most palpable of all legitimate control advantages has a certain
collateral fascination that would seem to warrant full presentation:
The major advantages to the [controlling] stockholders
which might be adverse to the interests of the [public] stock-
holders is the right to select the management and to establish
salary levels. Even here there are certain practical limits to the
extent of this advantage.
1. Obviously there are outside limits to the salaries which
might be paid without becoming subject to court attack on the
basis of violation of fiduciary responsibilities.
2. The action of replacing a large proportion of the officers
of the Company with incompetent friends or relatives in the
long run would be acting against the controlling party's own
interest.
3. If such employees were capable, the action might not be
adverse to the [public] stock unless the salaries were exhor-
bitant [sic] ; that might be attacked in the courts.
From a practical standpoint, it would seem that the chief
advantage of control is the right to elect the principal officer
of the corporation and thereby to obtain the largest salary
that could not be attacked in the courts plus other perquisites
of the office including such things as stock options, pensions,
insurance coverage, et cetera. 6
As with supplier and consumer contracts, salary awards both to self
and friends or relatives can carry distinct and calculable benefits even
though the corporation's right to a generous quid pro quo is scrupulously
observed.
Corporate Improvement: One of the most subtle-and hence worthy
of some later discussion--of all the values attaching to corporate control
35. Report at 340.
36. Id.
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was mentioned early by Judge Hincks in his attempt to present some
"specific applications of the power."
For instance, to the usual minority stockholder in a cor-
poration the value of his stock necessarily depends on earnings
which in turn depend on the ability of its management. But
one considering the purchase of a control block in a corpora-
tion may give less weight to past earnings since, if a change in
management might be beneficial, the power to make such a
change is in his hands. . . . Surely this power through stock
control to improve the corporate performance may be a factor
of value attaching to a control block of stock."
This opportunity "to improve the corporate performance" can be viewed
from many aspects, and so it will betimes. For the present, classify it as
one more legitimate reward of corporate control.
This conspectus of the legitimate-and one must be vigilant to keep
them so-advantages of control will constitute the wherewithal in facing
the question posed by Pollack in Porco and allegedly by Bluhdorn,
GW and Fasco. These various specifications of "merely the control
potential" of the block of Brown stock can serve for ready reference
throughout. The first question, therefore, was indeed answerable. It
is "possible to break down this 'control potential' into its constituent
-and salable-elements. ' ' 38  But what of the other questions: "Once
broken down, moreover, why do these control elements belong exclusively
to the 'controlling stockholder'? Why is there 'no obligation under such
circumstances to 'share and share alike" with the 77 per cent public
shareholders ?"9
TOTAL CONTROLEUR CONTRIBUTION
Mythical Rikling Nut and Rivet, Inc. had been the only child of the
three Rikling brothers. Based in Syracuse, Mythical Rikling has a net
worth of 150 million dollars, ranked 482 in Fortune's select 500
industrials, and generally enjoyed the highest respect in the community.
But, retired and now in their midseventies, the three brothers faced a
delicate control problem with their firm.
Some ten years earlier the three had decided, after some 40 years
at the grindstone, that their startling successes with Mythical Rikling
warranted the sun and leisure of Lauderdale. Their solution-and also to
37. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952) (Emphasis
added).
38. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
39. Id.
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preserve and increase MR's assets for the benefit of their joint charity
-had been a voting trust holding the third interests of each. The voting
trustee had been a hard-charger, much in the Rikling mold, who had
prosecuted the corporate bonum commune with the same successes of the
halcyon days. But the idyll was now threatened with the reluctant
resignation-the ten-year term of the trust was expiring-of their hard-
charger contr6leur. Who to succeed to the office?
The marriage brokers were put on the spoor and the field for a
successor contr6leur was narrowed to two, a Rikling relative and a
brash interloper by the name of Richard B. Jarneen. The Riklings had
determined to reinstate the voting trust, with the added provision in a
point will that the new contr6leur would carry on after the brothers'
death under a strict trust and appoint his successor ad infinitum.
Successor Suitability
The years of experience had given the Riklings a very crystallized
concept of the manifold qualifications required of a competent contr6leur
of 'Mythical Rikling, or for that matter of any corporation. As sole owners
they were not bedeviled by any moral or legal fiduciary duty to select
the most competent personnel, especially the successor contr6leur-not
that they were blind to the interests of their charity-but the brothers
were nevertheless determined that their appointee meet the elemental,
fivefold norm of successor suitability: (1) 'Moral integrity; (2) Intel-
lectual competence; (3) Managerial and organizational proficiency; (4)
Social suitability; and (5) Satisfactory age and health.
The Riklings were astute observers of human nature. In both young
Jarneen and the aspirant Rikling, the brothers saw highly capable com-
petitors. Both were honest to a fault. There would be no walking "the
borderline," let alone any concern, even secondarily, "with advantages
from the possible illegal actions." As to talents it was a toss-up. Both
moreover could be expected to work long devoted hours. Finally, since
neither would-be contr6leur owned any stock, neither would be tempted
to minority-shareholder-serving maneuvers.
In a word, each would bring to the corporate bargaining table sub-
stantial assets in the form of contr6leur talents. Although each had
different personal qualifications, the total contr6leur contribution of each
would indeed constitute valuable consideration in the negotiation of the
employment contract.
A resolution of the dilemma of equal suitability was found in inter-
views and negotiations with the prospective contr6leurs.
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TOTAL CORPORATE COMPENSATION
Over against the respective offers of the candidates the Riklings
decided to lay out the corresponding corporate consideration, the "specific
areas of advantage" surrounding the office of control of Mythical Rik-
ling Nut and Rivet, Inc. Since each prospect presented comparable
credentials and since the demands of the office were both stable and
estimable, the Riklings offered an identical package of tangible induce-
ments to both. The predecessor's salary of 100,000 dollars was to be
augmented by a sliding scale of profit-based bonuses. Since MR's 100
million dollars in annual sales would predictably increase at the recent
ten per cent rate, this could net at least 10,000 dollars in the early years.
Beyond the usual perquisities-the firm's boat, the company Cadillac, an
executive assistant-MR had usually underwritten the initiation fee and
75 per cent of the annual dues at both the Century Club and the Onondaga
Country Club. The outgoing contr~leur had rated these collateral bene-
fits at 3,000 dollars a year. Group health and life policies, the pension
plan and stock options exercisable for the life of the trust totaled another
7,000 dollars. As the Rikling brothers saw it, in tangibles alone the
corporation's offer would total roughly 120,000 dollars per year.
Negotiations
In a highly communicative meeting with the Rikling scion, the
three old brothers realized that their cousin, even without a single share
of Mythical Rikling, was driven by a deeply sincere-and to the brothers
a highly creditable--desire to build the firm that bore his name to a
position of preeminence in the nut-and-rivet world. ("At least, it is
worth 5,000 dollars a year if they let me see that outfit succeed.") With
thoughts of Armour and William Wood Prince the three old Riklings
were not unhappy. To them this was the pure altruist with only one
thought, to build for the benefit of others.
Apart from this Robin Hood, man-on-the-white-horse approach
young Rikling anticipated a certain personal, almost Germanic, satisfac-
tion in the hard work, the palpable progress, the orderly organization of
his very own creature. "Their offer goes up another 5,000 dollars just
for the privilege of doing things in my own precise way." Young
Rikling agreed with Judge Hincks: "Surely this power through . . .
control to improve the corporate performance may be a factor of value
attaching to... control."
The upshot of the interview: All four Riklings agreed that the
total-tangible and intangible-corporate remuneration of 130,000
dollars should adequately compensate young Rikling for his total con-
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tr6leur contribution to the future of Mythical Rikling Nut and Rivet,
Inc.
As a study in human energy and ambition, Jarneen was even more
interesting, lie had had no connection whatsoever with Mythical Rikling.
Not only was he shareless, but he would come from an archcompetitor,
and had been acquainted with the company only on a business basis.
Further, apart from equal qualifications, Jarneen was the antipolar
extreme to Rikling. While Rikling could put a 5,000 dollar price tag on
the opportunity to enhance the family name, Jarneen saw the same value
in the chance to build a personal empire. Jarneen was a lineal descendant of
Samuel Insull, the Van Sweringens, and the Rockefellers. His modern
counterparts head up Genesco, IT&T, City Investing, Textron. Mythical
Rikling Nut and Rivet, Inc. would soon become MRNR Industries, Inc.
and each new acquisition would be one more diadem for the Jarneen
royal head.
Beyond this sense of power, this absolute authority, Jarneen was
ready to admit that the prestige of the position--contr6leur, chairman
of the board, chief executive officer of 'MRNR Industries, Inc.' -was as
good as another 5,000 dollars in the bank. Mythical Rikling was a
prestigious name in Syracuse. Its top executives had long been civil
notables. All this added dollars to the corporate offer.
But Jarneen parted company with young Rikling on another im-
portant item of control value. Jarneen saw a very attractive program of
self-advancement and self-benefit in the day-in-and-day-out allocation
of the many corporate contracts with suppliers, consumers, top-level
executives. Not that Jarneen was dishonest. To the contrary. He had no
thought of even approaching the Glore, Forgan border line. He reasoned
this way: It would be worth 10,000 dollars a year personally to appoint
a hitherto unknown, albeit impressively competent, 'comer' to the pre-
sidency of the firm; to help out a struggling but honest die manufacturer;
to assure a certain construction company of a fair deal and a steady
source of rivets. In every instance the deal would be a rigid quid pro
quo with absolutely no conflict of interest, but the legitimate advantage
would be nonetheless appreciable, even if unconscionably long-range.
The Premium for Control
With the cards thus on the table, the three Riklings, and young
Jarneen, sensed that the intangibles in the corporate offer were far more
valuable--$10,000 exactly-to jarneen than to young Rikling. Taking
stock within himself, Richard B. jarneen compared in dollars and cents
the emolument he would personally receive from MR-a total figure of
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140,000 dollars per annum in corporate compensation, tangible and
intangible-with MR's comparable offer to Rikling, which totaled only
130,000 dollars. The 10,000 dollar annual differential in the corpora-
tion's offer impressed Jarneen with his superior bargaining position.
After much calculation he concluded that 50,000 dollars-the difference
accumulated over a five-year period-would be a sensible investment
toward "the control potential" that would predictably extend well beyond
such a short tenure.
Armed with this conviction, and an almost oppressive desire to
control 'MRNR Industries, Inc.,' Jarneen approached the three Riklings
with a proposition: He would accept the contr6leurship of Mythical
Rikling on the terms discussed and, to cinch the deal, therewith offer to
pay the three brothers a 50,000 dollar premium for the control of the
company. Jarneen was almost childlike in his forthright enumeration of
the many control values he sought. Knowing that MR regarded its offers
to each as identical Jarneen was convinced that the premium would win
the day. The three brothers were not unimpressed.
Confident of young Jarneen's honesty, ability and above all his
driving ambition for the firm, the founders and owners of Mythical
Rikling Nut and Rivert, Inc. had already determined that young Jarneen
embodied all five requisites of contr6leur suitability, and was definitely
the man for the job.
They could not, however, restrain a wry smile at the proffer of the
premium for control. Jarneen was almost callow in his inability to cor-
relate the proffered premium with the collateral contract of contr6leur
employment. As they pointed out to Jarneen, after all, they were the sole
owners of MR, and all the corporate assets were effectively theirs. More-
over, MR had just formulated a deal whereby the corporation would pay
him some 140,000 dollars consideration in exchange for his labor and
industry. Every item of this consideration-whether salary, perquisites,
options or pensions, whether the intangibles of power, prestige or contract
allocation-was a corporate asset flowing under the contract from MR
to Jarneen. How fatuous, therefore, for the three brothers to receive
50,000 dollars from Jarneen with one hand while paying him twice that
amount in salary with the other. The simple solution: Offset the 'per-
mium' against the salary, and thereby maintain the original stipulation of
130,000 dollars in corporate remuneration. Thus reduced, the total cor-
porate compensation would equal Jarneen's total contr6leur contribu-
tion to the company. Merely pro rate the 50,000 dollar 'premium' over
the five-year period, and cut the salary accordingly to 90,000 dollars per
annum.
NONINVESTMENT VALUE
True, salary, perquisites, prestige, power, are all estimable and
legitimate control values. As valuable, they are salable. As salable, Jarneen
could do well to 'buy' every one of them by 'paying' a substantial 'price'
for their 'purchase.' But since the corporation is the owner of each, since
only the owner sells, and since the corporation disburses these very
assets to Jarneen for his work for the firm-they form the congeries of
emolument at the disposal of the corporation for the remuneration of the
incumbent contr6leur-Jarneen should 'pay' the 'premium for control'
to the owner, by lowering his salary in the agreed amount. Any 'pre--
mium' should be recognized as simply such a deduction, an acknowledg-
ment that the corporate remuneration had been too great.
After this circuitous return to reality, the Riklings and young
Jarneen closed the deal at 90,000 dollars in salary, plus 40,000 dollars
per annum in fringe benefits, tangible and intangible. Which was the
same amount MR would have paid young Rikling, had he won the day.
The Stock-Enhancement Factor
Vary the suppositions of the mythical Mythical Rikling in one im-
portant particular, but otherwise leave all the facts intact. Presume, in the
fairy-book Prince-Armour formula, that the brothers Rikling, dreaming
of the day now arrived, had each bestowed a third of a share of MRNR
on the newborn cousin and heir apparent. Thus, some three decades later,
the Riling scion approaches the same bargaining table armed with his
same high ideals, family aspirations, overall contr6leur suitability, but
holding in his hand a further factor of moving importance, his one share
-- one per cent, 1.5 million dollars worth-of Mythical Rikling Nut and
Rivet, Inc.
Granted, the total ownership of MR had scarce been altered. Each
brother still owned a third, and the one per cent against the 99 would
change the bargaining impact not a whit. But to young Rikling-apart
from any clout at the table-that one share gave rise to an appreciable
dollar-and-cents consideration as he totted up the several "advantages of
control" and estimated his total corporate compensation from MRNR.
In early 1964 old man Weyenberg, founder and longtime con-
tr6leur of the highly successful Weyenberg Shoe Manufacturing Com-
pany (again the parallel is pat with both Armour and MRNR) found
himself in his early eighties bereft of a successor and long ready to
resign. 1 His choice was Thomas W. Florsheim of the Florsheim name
40. Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Conn. 1952).
41. Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-Florsheint
Case Study, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 438 (1966).
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who readily assumed control and embarked the firm on a vigorous
promotional program (striking ads in Time, the Wall Street Journal, and
the New York Times) and an aggressive acquisition approach (the
prestigious Nunn-Bush). The result: Florsheim's three per cent 600,000
dollar interest in Weyenberg Shoe increased in value by a satisfying 100
per cent within the five-year period ending in 1969.42 Apart completely
from all the other legitimate rewards of control, old man Weyenberg had
given Florsheim the opportunity "to improve the corporate performance"
and thereby enhance the value of his own stock by an estimable 600,000
dollars.
This Florsheim lesson was not lost on Rikling. Quick arithmetic
showed him a similar situation. If his own considerable contr6leur talents
could up "MRNR's annual five per cent after-tax return to seven, his
personal increment would be some 30,000 dollars on his 1.5 million
dollar holding. Were he to invest an annual 10,000 dollars to guarantee
his increment, the net would be a yearly 20,000 dollars beyond his return
at the firm's present pace. Moving further in his calculations, Riling
decided on a five-year gamble of an accumulated 50,000 dollars for the
projected 150,000 dollars, especially since his youth gave every prospect
of many years longer than five.
From this point forward the drama took on all the aspects of a
replay of the Jarneen negotiations. With the extra 10,000 dollars in
stock-enchancement compensation, Riling, as had Jarneen, proffered a
50,000 dollar premium for the control of MRNR.
Once again came the same wry smile, the same restrained wonder
at the callowness of youth, the same patient explanation of the realities
of the relation between Rikling's contr6leur contribution, labor, industry,
honesty, and MRNR's corporate compensation, salary, perquisites, power,
prestige-and now the opportunity to enhance the value of his one per
cent 'block.' The upshot was the same. Young Rikling realized that this
extra control advantage should be 'paid for' not with a 50,000 dollar
premium, but rather by a simple reduction of the stipulated 100,000
dollars in salary. With that deal sealed, family considerations prevailed
and Rikling became contr6leur with compensation at 130,000 dollars,
tangible and intangible, which was the same amount MR would have
paid Jarneen, had he won the day. The further absurdity occurred to them
all. To the extent of his ownership of MRNR, Rikling would in effect
be paying a premium to himself.
Thus this 'opportunity' "to improve the corporate performance" is
42. The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 1969, at 31, col. 5.
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merely another asset in the corporate treasury, available on proper
occasion for contr6leur compensation. Note, however, that this particular
'opportunity to improve the firm'-the stock-enhancement factor-is not
the same 'control value' as either the Robin Hood's pleasure in helping
the firm or the Germanic satisfaction in building both of which are
'control values' and could be called the 'opportunity' "to improve the
corporate performance."
This addition of the stock-enhancement factor should complete the
list of those "advantages" flowing from "merely the control potential"
of the office.
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE CONTROL ASSETS
Implicit in these MRNR fantasies has been a realization-too
elusive for the past-that could well dispel much of the confusion cloud-
ing the concept of control value. Both parties to the Mythical Rikling
contract fully sensed-albeit subliminally-the governing truth that all
these control advantages belonged without exception to the corporation,
that the contr6leur personally did not produce any of these assets for
himself, that all were for the firm. But this is only half the matter. The
other half of the Riling perception was a series of subtle distinctions
far at the base of the various corporate control values. An exact analysis
of these distinctions should give deeper understanding to the Rikling
negotiations, and the noninvestment value of control stock.
Corporate Administration
In the theoretical-but very real-beginning of every corporation
the shareholder owners in a deliberate appropriation entrust the corporate
assets to the untrammeled dominion of that necessary top-level authority,
the contr6leur. In acquiescing to this appropration the contr6leur thereby
assumes custody of the entity, with all its duties and rights. Technically,
therefore, corporate control is a relation of total custody subsisting be-
tween the subjective term, the office of control, and the objective term, the
corporate entity itself. In this relation inhere all the corporate rights and
duties. In accepting this stewardship the contr6leur dedicates himself
unremittingly to the overall corporate welfare. He acknowledges himself
a strict trustee and accepts the stringencies of the benefit-to-beneficiary anct
no-inquiry rule. His sole undertaking: To administer the corporation ant
utilize its assets to the exclusive advantage of the shareholder owners.
In this administration of the corporation ad bonum commune the
contr6leur, as the chief corporate agent, has been burdened with that
complexus of corporate duties originally imposed by the state, at the
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instance of the incorporators, and enumerated in the corporate purposes
of the charter. These corporate duties have become necessarily the con-
tr6leur's duties. Thus, for example, AT&T has formally undertaken a
vast public service. The duties incurred by this undertaking are legion,
from the construction of a computerized switchboard in New York to the
selection of the appropriate Princess for a lady in Duluth. Set off against
these manifold duties is a perfectly correlative set of corporate rights,
ranging from the appointment of top executives-including incidentally,
if need be, a successor contr6leur-to the allocation of major contracts
with suppliers and consumers, on down to the employment of linemen,
switchboard operators and ditch-diggers. All these rights and duties inhere
essentially in the corporate entity. Incumbent on the entity is the perform-
ance, through its agents, of this broad corporate obligation of public
service, and all the subobligations implict in it. Correspondingly, to the
corporate entity attach all the rights necessary for the performance,
through its agents, of all the correlative duties. Sitting as he is at the top
of the corporate hierarchy, the contr6leur, therefore, must see to the
performance of these duties, the exercise of these rights, all the entity's
benefit.
The office of control-in the person of the contr6leur-possesses
the totality of these corporate rights and duties. In fact the ambit of the
contr6leur's official authority and responsibility-the limits of his job-
is coterminous with the rights and duties of the corporation as spelled out,
or implicit, in its charter. The contr6leur is hired to prosecute the
corporate goals by performing the corporate rights and duties. Thus all
the rights of the contr6leur qua contr6leur are control rights. And all
the duties, control duties. Because of the virtual identification of the
contr6leur with his office, and the corresponding relation of the office
to the entity, this is a justifiable viewpoint for the study of the non-
investment control values.
The Direct Returns of Corporate Control
In going about his day-to-day duties the contr6leur is presumably
visited with some success. The enlightened managerial policy of AT&T's
contr6leur produces an upswing in the earnings record, and healthy
profits for dividends or expansion. A sound corporate structure encour-
ages investment and hence capital increment. The selection of aggressive
personnel increases further the profit potential and ultimately augments
the assets. All these advantages flowing from the contr6leur endeavors
in the corporate behalf are by no means limited to high-level administra-
tion but include the most menial, from the productivity of the computeriz-
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ed board in New York to the tender care of the Duluth office. But all
these returns from the energy of the contr6leur are very real control
values and are directly and primarily referable to the performance of the
corporation's duties and the exercise of its rights under the contr6leur's
general guidance.
The Indirect Advantages
But the corporate rewards of the contr6leur's industry are not all
primary and direct. The competent contr6leur creates a corporate climate
that encompasses a broad list of assets of extreme value to the company.
Thanks to the same enlightened managerial policy, all the employees-
from ditchdigger on up even to the contr6leur himself--enjoy their work,
feel the exhilaration of accomplishment, the satisfaction of good working
conditions, the prestige of their positions with Bell- or possibly reap
the legitimate byproducts of contract allocation, managerial appoint-
ments, customer selection, or even the enhancement of their AT&T
stock. A solid corporate structure plus superb personnel gradually effect
a substantial going-concern value and notable corporate goodwill. All
these collateral benefits are corporate assets adding to the overall worth
of the firm.
The utilization by the contr6leur of the control rights and the
performance of the control duties, therefore, result in a broad spectrum
of benefits, products, profits- the sum of corporate assets produced
through the corporate administration entrusted to the office of control.
The totality of these benefits, direct and indirect, represents the totality of
control advantages, the collective fruit of the custodial administration of the
corporation, the exercise of control. Quite clearly this totality is by no
means limited to those "control advantages" laid out in the Rilding--or
Glore, Forgan-list. Some of these values flow from the labor expended
toward the direct and primary objectives of the corporate business, some
are secondary and collateral gains. But all are the result of official cor-
porate effort. All are produced by corporate agents on corporate time
toward the corporate well-being pursuant to the charter purposes, and
ultimately under the direction of the corporate contr6leur. All conse-
quently are corporate assets. Here, then, is the totality of control values.
The Rights of the Human Person
But how dovetail these corporate duties and rights into the personal
rights and duties of the humans-especially the human contr6eur-
who man the entity? Generally speaking, all the employees, from ditch-
digger, operator, lineman on up to the chief executive officer and finally
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the contr6leur, come to their jobs at AT&T with the same class of
personal duties and rights. Their duty is fivefold: To be honest, ade-
quately intelligent, industrious and proficient, socially adaptable, physically
fit. In a word, to do their best for the firm. Their rights are correspond-
ing: to receive sufficient salary, health and retirement benefits, the
respect and dignity of the position, the satisfaction and exhilaration of
the job, the opportunity to improve the firm.
Thus the duty and right to dig the ditch and erect the computer
belong to AT&T. The duty and right to represent AT&T in the perform-
ance of its duty and right belong to the employee. For the performance of
his personal duty-labor, honesty, industry-AT&T recognizes the
employee's personal right to salary, perquisites, prestige and power. In
fulfilling, as agent, the corporate duties and exercising the corporate
rights, the employee-including the contr6leur-earns his appropriate
compensation disbursed from the corporate assets, whether from the store
of direct control assets, e.g., salary, options, perquisites, or the indirect,
e.g., presitge, power, satisfaction.
The Corporate vis-a-vis the Personal
At this point the sharp control-value dichotomy, the direct and the
indirect, plus the set-off of personal from corporate rights and duties,
prompt the introduction into the control lexicon of two new technical terms
embodying these various distinctions.
Personal Control Advantages are corporate control values flow-
ing either primarily and directly or secondarily and collaterally
from the performance of official corporate duties and rights,
and passed on by the corporation to the human occupant of the
office of control as his total corporate compensation for the per-
formance of his personal duties and rights.
Over against these strictly personal rewards of control are other con-
comitant corporate benefits:
Corporate Control Returns are corporate control values flow-
ing either primarily and directly or secondarily and collaterally
from the performance of official corporate duties and rights,
and necessarily retained in the corporate net worth.
In both cases-Personal Control Advantages and Corporate Control
Returns-these control values are corporate assets accuring to the cor-
poration as a result of corporate effort expended toward the corporate
welfare. In the former, the corporation simply sees fit to disburse the
NONINVESTMENT VALUE
emolument, direct or indirect, to the person holding the position of con-
trol, as recompense for a job well done. In the latter, the corporation
retains necessarily the benefits, direct or indirect, as the sought-for fruits
of the corporate program toward profit-making. The key concepts are
disbursal and retention. Nothing else distinguishes them. Both are species
of the genus Corporate Control Values, corporate assets broadly re-
ferable to the overall corporate administration of the contr6leur. Ulti-
mately, of course, and here is the catch in the whole piece, all these
control values' are simply subproducts of the total corporate product
viewed, by force of the multiform problems raised by the sale of control,
from the slightly forced aspect of the person who happens to hold the
office of control, or the one who wants to 'buy' it.
But in the view of any other observer, these values are no more
'control values' than they are directorial values or chief-executive-officer
values or presidential values. They are simply corporate assets. Nothing
more. But over the decades contr6leurs have tried to sell them off as
if they were really their own personal possessions, as if 'control value'
meant an asset belonging to the human in control rather than as asset
produced under the corporate administration of the office of control.
Hence a spate of misnomers and a botch of fallacies. Which leads to the
last major point.
TH5E SALE-OF-CONTROL PREMIUM-BRIBE
For the last time, recur to Mythical Rikling Nut and Rivet, Inc.
and make two last-but major-alterations in that hardy hypothetical.
As before, the brothers Rikling-founders of the firm, joint holders of
every voting-trust certificate, long ready to retire-face the imminent
expiration of the voting trust and the vexing necessity of selecting a
successor contr6leur to guide the firm's future. Both the Rikling scion
and the aggressive young Jarneen are again in the wings, ready to serve.
But beyond all this, everything is not the same. The ten years of the
trust had not been kind to the three Rildings. Pressed by parlous times,
each succeeding year had seen their personal finances fail. The regretful
solution: A sizable stocksplit, 10,000 for one, and a successful secondary
offering of their entire 99 per cent. Since each sale was extremely small
and, more to the point, the purchasers were widely scattered, none of the
new owners held more than two per cent of the company. Thus the three
brothers, although completely shareless, nonetheless held unassailable
mere-incumbency control through the proxy mechanism and the wide
dispersal. But to their dismay they also held the awesome and onerous
obligation of entrusting 150 million dollars in other people's money into
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the unfettered hands of a new contr6leur.
Onto this deeply altered scene walked Victor Birwolf, entrepreneur
extraordinaire, who knew a good thing when he saw one. Fully apprised
of the many control values in MR's offer to Rikling and Jarneen-and
of possibilities that never occurred to these conscientious young men-
Birwolf joined his name to the list of prospective contr6leurs, but with a
difference. Whereas Rikling and Jarneen had both seen the fatuity of
their 50,000 dollar premiums for control, Birwolf was not so perspicaci-
ous, or perhaps more so. Birwolf not only saw the 'control advantages'
in the tangibles-salary, options, perquisites-and the intangibles-
power, prestige, the opportunity to improve the firm-but he looked even
beyond this 140,000 dollars. After all, the Rikling brothers would be
gone on the morrow, and his mere incumbency control would be absolute.
He further knew as no one else the true worth of his talents, and saw no
reason against a substantial salary increase at an early date. Glore,
Forgan's words kept running through his mind: "From a practical
standpoint . . . the chief advantage of control is ... to obtain the largest
salary that could not be attacked in the courts plus other perquisites of
the office." Birwolf tolled off a long litany of control values, especially
contract allocations to cronies, large salaries for "incompetent friends or
relatives," maybe even eventual liquidation, that were foreign to the
thoughts of Rikling and Jarneen. In a word, perhaps Birwolf was "not
primarily concerned with advantages from the possbile illegal actions,"
but his secondary concern was compelling.
To give proper expression to these sentiments Victor Birwolf con-
cluded to an offer of a 100,000 dollar sale-of-control premium, which he
promptly presented to the brothers Rikling.
The Premium-Bribe
For the three Riklings no astute argumentation was necessary to
penetrate to the heart of Birwolf's deal. No longer was it a case of three
owners receiving 100,000 dollars with one hand while paying out the
same amount in salary with the other. True, the owners would still be
paying the salary-and the perquisites, power, prestige, whatever-but
the owners would not be receiving the 100,000 dollar premium. As with
Rikling and Jarneen, how fatuous not to offset the premium directly
against the salary. But more pertinently, how dishonest to pay the
premium to the nonowners Rikling when it belonged to the owner share-
holders scattered across the country.
Here was nothing other than the bald primitive sale-of-control
premium-bribe:
NONINVESTMENT VALUE
(1) some form of consideration, monetary or otherwise, (2)
flowing to the incumbent contr6leur, (3) from or on behalf of
the prospective contr6leur, (4) to induce the appointment to
the office of control, (5) paid knowingly, scienter."3
Armed with this realization, and all the implications of the unsuitability
of a premium-briber-particularly his predictable propensity to recoup
his premium-bribe at the expense of a hapless ownership-the three
Riklings threw the charlatan out and betook themselves to their old
problem of choosing between their cousin and his competitor.
Fatuity Becomes Fraud
From the strictly factual standpoint-in contradistinction to any
intrinsic illegitimacy-the sale-of-control 'premium' ceases to be merely
fatuous and becomes downright dishonest when the payment goes not to
the owner but to a noncorporate third party. It becomes singularily schock-_
ing when that third party is a trusted agent who has dedicated himself to
the very owners he is cheating. The factual nub of the premium-bribe,
therefore, is the. payment of a 'rebate'-otherwise merely foolishly cir-
cuitous-to the wrong person.
One may admit to certain personal advantages flowing from the
office of control. As valuable, they may be 'sold.' But if 'sold,' the
'sellers' must invariably be the owners. When they in truth were the
owners, the Riklings could have entered into the ridiculous circuity of a
sale of control. No matter. If the new public owners of Mythical Rikling
want to indulge in a similar absurdity, also no matter. But if the non-
owners Rikling attempt to 'sell' the control they no longer 'own'--or
Birwolf attempts to 'buy' it-the result is aggravated larceny in the
subtle and oft-undetected guise of premium-bribery." Imbedded in this
larceny is a triple turpitude, the intrinsic illegitimacy of the premium-
bribe:
(1) the perversion of the judgment of the incumbent con-
tr6leur, engendered by an appointment of a successor induced
by a cause other than suitability, (2) that is, for consideration
illicit in itself, (3) resulting in the appointment of a candidate
unsuitable by reason of his own active role in the inducement.4 5
43. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premim: The Definition, 53 Mn1. L. REv.
485, 597 (1969).
44. N.Y. CONSOL. LAws § 180.00 [McKinney 1967].
45. Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Instrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TEXAS
L. REv. 215, 222 (1969).
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CONCLUSION
With all the distinctions and subdistinctions, the correlatives and the
antitheticals in the background, what can be said in technical summary of
'The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock,' and the many concepts and
subconcepts surrounding it? Concisely, what is the exact import of the
subject? The answer lies in an orderly process of exclusion and refine-
ment, a step-by-step narrowing from general to specific, down to the
point of an intelligible, and practical, delineation of the major burden of
this study.
Control Value. Here probably is the chief devil in the piece. 'Control
value' is so hopelessly generic a term as to be practically useless. It
includes everything, legitimate/illegitimate, stock/onstock, invest-
ment/noninvestment, direct/indirect, anything in any way pertaining to
any benefits, advantages, values, inuring to corporation or contr6leur or
anyone, through the impact of corporate control. Further, it is indeter-
minate about the ownership of these values. Are they 'owned'? And if
owned, may they be sold? And if salable, who may sell them? Or buy
them? The use, or misuse, of the term has left court and commentator
in an ill-defined state of chaos. Witness Feldmann and Porco. In short,
'control value' should be condemned to oblivion, except as an introductory
phrase demanding immediate technical qualification.
Illegitimate Control Values. The first such technical qualification
must be the elimination from consideration of all illegitimate returns
milked from and through the office. Strictly, such returns are not pro-
perly referable to control at all, but are simple larceny effected in a control
context. Any gain even secondary from "the possible illegal actions" or
activity along "the borderline" should be outside the definition of 'control
value.'
The Investment Value of Control Stock. The next narrowing saw
the exclusion from the concept of 'control value' of that possible incre-
ment to the stock itself-stock about to be purchased-attributable to the
advent of a talented new contr6leur. Here, the adjective 'Control' is a
transposed epithet which properly modifies neither 'stock' nor 'value' but
applies exclusively to the changed quality of the corporate administration.
The 'control change' heightens the investment value of all stock. Control
administration benefits the entire entity. Since the entity is merely the
conduit for every shareholder interest, any such gains flow perforce to
all equally. This 'investment value' applies to every share, not just those
about to be sold, whether 'control' or no, by whomever. As only remotely
related to 'control,' 'investment value' is scarcely a 'control value,' or at
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best only in some metonymic sense." Such use without immediate quali-
fication, therefore, is also anathema.
The Noninvestment Value of Control Stock. Whereas 'investment
value' referred solely to the purchased stock and not at all to the distant
'control,' the 'noninvestment value of control stock' refers only to control
and not a bit to the 'stock.' To a great extent their connection is an
historical anachronism. In earlier days a controlling block generally
accompanied a control transfer. Even today control is often passed by a
50-plus per cent stock block. Strictly, however, control itself is not con-
nected necessarily with the stock. 'Control' is exercisable without relation
to the base on which its tenure is founded, whether voting trust, proxy,
mere-incumbency, however.
With the 'stock' thus removed, the subject now becomes "The
Noninvestment Value of Control." But is not 'noninvestment' also super-
fluous? After all, it was used only to negate the concept of 'investment'
and eliminate any connection with the stock. With 'stock' gone, why talk
of 'noninvestment' at all? Investment is only in stock, perforce. Absent the
need to eradicate the historical anachronism, both words are unnecessary.
To use the prefix 'non' before 'investment' in the same phrase with
'stock' in redundant. The elimination of both 'noninvestment' and 'stock'
leaves a better title: The Value of Control.
Corporate Control Assets. This circumscribed, the proper perspective
begins to appear. The only 'values' correctly denominated 'control' are
those corporate benefits, products, profits, produced through the control
administration. As such, every last one of them is a corporate asset. But
when the average layman-if ever he were to blunder onto the term-
refers to 'the noninvestment value of control stock'-or better, 'the value
of control'-he would never mean all the Corporate Control Assets. The
concept is still too inclusive.
Corporate Control Returns. Even though they are in every sense
'control assets,' those corporate returns from the contr6leur's administra-
tion retained in the corporate net worth-annual profits, capital increment,
going-concern value-are never referred to as 'control values.' Why?
Although ultimately produced by the work of the contr6leur-and to
this extent 'control values'-they are not paid out to him personally, thus
never become doubly the contr6leur's own. The discussion of Corporate
Control Returns was necessary only to distinguish them from the last
remaining class of 'control values.'
Personal Control Advantages. Here then is the end of the line. Some
46. See Bayne, The Investment Value of Control Stock, 22 STANe. L REv. - (1970).
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corporate assets, once in the corporate treasury through the contr6leur's
efforts, hence 'control values,' are then disbursed to the contr6leur him-
self in payment for his work for the firm. These are the 'control values,'
doubly so in a sense, of which the layman-and the lawyer, judge,
writer-should speak. The technically correct title should read:
The Personal Control Advantages Accorded the Contr6leur as Cor-
porate Compensation.
Two Parting Adversions
With the title thus changed and the concepts clarified, no further
questions should arise about the ownership of these corporate assets, or
their salability, or their purchase for a premium. As corporate assets
originally and as contr6leur remuneration eventually, the thought of
'selling' or 'buying' them is fully as callow as the Rikling-Jarneen
50,000 dollar 'premium' for the 'sale of control'.
Finally, equally otiose should be any discusson of the intrinsically
illegitimate Birwolf premium-bribe. Granted the fatuity of the Rikling-
Jarneen 'premium,' at least the 50,000 dollars was destined for the true
'owners.' ]Birwolf on the contrary was prepared to pay an illicit 100,000
dollars to nonowners Rikling, an act of premium-bribery.
All the misnomers strewn through these pages-notably the title
itself-and the fallacies behind them had their genesis, as with Hincks in
Feldmann, Pollack in Porco, in one pervasive misconception: That
somewhere amid all those control values-salary, perquisites, prestige,
power, particularly the opportunity to improve the corporate performance
-something must be the personal possession of the contr6leur himself.
That somehow corporate control could legitimately be sold.
Which, of course, set the purpose of this study: To lay these mis-
nomers and fallacies to rest once and for all. To show simply that the
values resultant on control can never be sold, except by the owners. To
establish above all that the contr6leur is not an owner, merely an
employee. To prove that the contr6leur, as an employee, produced these
assets for the corporation, not for himself personally.
